The uneasy relationship between laboratory science and clinical medicine goes back a long way. In the nineteenth century, these things were better managed in mainland Europe. Claude Bernard summarized the approach that gave the French and German schools their revolutionary successes 3 . Arguing that physiological processes were just as causally determined as any other natural process, he gave the biological sciences the concept of`determinism' which has been the implicit assumption behind their stratospheric growth in modern times. The control of disease depended upon an understanding of physiological and chemical mechanisms, since, as Comte had observed, the same natural laws apply to both. This assertion seems almost a cliche Â to readers accustomed to the writings of modern reductionist biologists. What had greatest impact was the conclusion Bernard drew from this approachÐthat there was little place in medical progress for clinical observations on individuals or populations. Observation devoid of experimentation was equivalent to analysing what was going on in a house by counting how many people went in, or how much smoke came out of the chimney. Medical science could not afford to be`passive' in the manner of astronomy. If the human body worked like a clock, as Descartes had argued, all the competent clockmaker needs to know is how it normally functions and what obstacle prevents it from doing so.
The values of Bernardian determinism survive in the continuing debate between advocates of basic and applied research. A Director of Research for the NHS is made painfully aware of such tensions. I forget the number of times I was lectured on the fact that medical advance depends upon non-targeted research on biological mechanisms. The only difference from Bernard's day was that the examples were molecular rather than organ-based. The truth of all this was self-evident; the confusion lay in the inability to distinguish the necessary from the suf®cient.
Britain in Bernard's day was, as Huxley put it,`far behind France and in®nitely behind Germany' 4 . There were two related reasons for thisÐthe low esteem in which science was held in the university system, and the separation of medical practice from laboratory science. The tradition of clinical science was`passive', to use Bernard's derogatory word, observational rather than experimental. One powerful if ill-recognized in¯uence was the natural history movement. Before Darwin and the development of physiology, the most widespread symbols of British biological science were the seaweed collection, the aquarium and the fern cabinet 5 . When Francis Galton undertook his survey, English Men of Science: Their Nature and Nurture (1874), a`medical subsection' was asked to identify the origin of their taste for science. Galton records one of the answers verbatim.`I trace the origin of my interest in science 1) To my mother's mental activity and love of collecting and arranging. 2) To the friendship of three eminent botanists by whom I was induced to study botany. 3) To my profession, the choice of which was in some measure determined by my taste for collecting and studying' 6 .
The relation between modern science and medicine in these different cultures is summarized in Flexner's words when he compared the English consultant, for whom scienti®c distinction`is a becoming decoration, not the breath of his nostrils', with the German professor`®rst and foremost a teacher and investigator' 7 . When the Haldane Commission proposed adopting the German model of academic clinicians in London medical schools, in¯uential London clinicians reacted with horror at the prospect of treating hospital patients as a form of experimental reagent' 8 . As FG Young put it,`The old order did not change and give place to the new either quickly or gracefully' 9 . Claude Bernard would have had a hard time in British medicine.
The tensions between the culture of medicine and the culture of biological science did not end with this signal event. Indeed, that historical tension, owing so much to status and tradition, has been reinforced by the pressures of scienti®c success as pro®ciency in science and medicine has become progressively more demanding and timeconsuming, and a succession of reports describe the`crisis in academic medicine' as though it were a recent phenomenon 10, 11 .
THE THIRD CULTURE: FROM THE`NUMERICAL METHOD' TO`CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY'
A third culture has lately had a profound in¯uence upon healthcare. Its gestation was longer and much more painful than that of any of the laboratory sciences. This is the statistical science which analyses aggregated data from groups of individuals. The early battles took place upon the Continent, but in this century they have spilled over to the UK and North America.
The origin of this struggle was the school of Me Âdecine d'Observation founded by Pierre Charles Alexandre Louis in the 1830s 12, 13 . The lack of persuasive methods for preventing or controlling an outbreak of cholera in Odessa convinced Louis that he should return to his scienti®c roots in Paris. The`numerical method' which he espoused sought to characterize disease in terms distinct from the traditional clinical anecdote and from the analysis of physiological mechanisms. Careful observations were made on individual cases and then statistics were tabulated in a standardized form. Louis' published work is wide-ranging. His numerical studies of the major infectious diseases such as typhoid fever and tuberculosis were landmarks. It was, however, his investigation of bleeding as a treatment of in¯ammatory diseases that had the greatest impact. In his early observations, Louis found no evidence that patients who were bled early in their treatment for typhoid fared any better than those who were notÐindeed they did rather worse. Such was the force of medical opinion that he could not bring himself to reach a categorical conclusion; nonetheless, Louis' work did initiate a steady decline in the use of bleeding as a treatment.
Louis' approach employed simple arithmetic. Successors such as Gavarret used the sophisticated mathematics of probability, developed by Laplace and Poisson, to calculate the likelihood that a treatment would or would not work in a given patient 13 . Medical statistics, now familiar to us, was quite revolutionary in those days, threatening both the clinical and the physiological traditions. The numerical method, opponents argued, ignored the unique nature of disease in an individual patient. It was clearly inferior to the determinist approach to disease mechanisms which gave precise outcomes rather than probabilities.
For once, the clinical tradition and laboratory science were united, in opposing the numerical method. Thus the physician Fran cois Double could write:`In statistical affairs . . . the ®rst care above all else is to lose sight of the man taken in isolation in order to consider him as only a fraction of the species. It is necessary to strip him of individuality . . . it is altogether different in the domain of medicine'. This approach would reduce a physician to a shoemaker who, after measuring the feet of a thousand, persisted in ®tting everyone on the basis of the imaginary model. Others argued mechanistically that diseases such as typhoid were the result of in¯ammation, which was characterized by increased blood¯ow: bleeding was therefore logical. Bernard was to put the same point more forcefully:`The observation that the mortality from an operation is 2 out of 5 means literally nothing. The law of large numbers never teaches us about any particular case'. From the Olympian heights of positivist philosophy, Auguste Comte could write of the`theory of chances' as a profound aberration, one that would reduce practitioners to a servile status in which they had to accept ideas imposed on them by professors on the basis of collection of several hundred observations 13 . His words were echoed 160 years later by the editor of the New England Journal of Medicine, faced with the quality movement and evidence-based protocols:`From a system dominated by intelligent and thoughtful decisionmaking, we seem to be embarking on a path to codify medicine' 14 . It is intriguing that there should be such a convergence in the writings of a positivist French nineteenth century philosopher and a distinguished medical journalist.
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REBIRTH OF THE NUMERICAL METHOD
The numerical method was clearly unwelcome in the twin medical and physiological cultures. Its rebirth in the twentieth century was equally painful but was the result of an overriding forceÐhistorical necessity. Neither the clinical tradition nor physiological determinism alone could evaluate adequately what science had created. When the great Robert Koch claimed that he had found a cure for tuberculosis in the form of tuberculin, the excitement was shortlived as it became increasingly clear not merely that the treatment did not work, but that it might even hasten death. Koch's reputation never fully recovered 15 . In another celebrated controversy, Almroth Wright's use of inoculation against typhoid in the army was challenged by Karl Pearson, one of the founding fathers of medical statistics, on the grounds of the crudity and inaccuracy of the analysis 16 . Wright, who unusually combined the skills of laboratory scientist and clinician, retorted by describing Pearson as a`layman without any practical acquaintance with medical matters'. In more recent times, there have been several examples of interventions that entered medicine without bene®t of the numerical method. Most notorious was the extensive use of antiarrhythmic drugs to control ventricular extrasystoles after myocardial infarction 17 . When a trial was ®nally conducted, it was terminated prematurely because of excess mortality in the treated group. Some have reckoned that more Americans died as a result of this treatment than were killed in the Vietnam War.
There is a second reason for the manifest failure of physiological mechanisms to predict the outcome of interventions. This is the massive complexity that was exposed when physiology moved from the whole organ to molecular level. What has changed is not the philosophical belief of scientists (who still in the main hold a reductionist position) but a multiplicity of interacting processes revealed by biological science. This makes claims to predictive value implausible. One has only to consider the complex molecular and mechanical processes that lead to atheromatous plaque formation and rupture to realise the impossibility of predicting from these processes alone when a man is going to have a heart attack 18 . This is evident even in the apparently straightforward physiological processes described by Bernard. They are the result of statistical aggregation of many molecular processes, just as the detested`calculus of probabilities' was the result of the aggregation of individual patient data. The synthesis and release of glucose by the liver demonstrated originally by Bernard is achieved by a series of biochemical pathways, regulated by hormones and chemical changes in the blood through receptors on the surface of cells which are, in turn, independently regulated. Within the cells, a cascade of biochemical processes links secretion of glucose to the ®rst`signal' received by the receptor molecules at the surface of the cell. What Bernard observed was an aggregate of effects achieved by Nature not by mathematicians. Reluctantly, clinical medicine and traditional biological science have had to accept a modern version of the`numerical method'.
CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY AND EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE'
The debate between the three cultures has frequently resembled a struggle for supremacy. The early successful resistance to the numerical method has been re¯ected in modern times by a remarkable reversal of positions as a movement has emerged to give priority to Louis' and Gavarret's successors.
A rousing manifesto was issued in the Journal of the American Medical Association in 1992 19 . Readers were told: A new paradigm is emerging. Evidence-based medicine de-emphasises intuition, unsystematic clinical experience and pathophysiological rationale as suf®cient grounds for clinical decision-making'. The randomized controlled trial is placed at the top of the hierarchy of evidence. Because', we are told in the standard text,`the randomised trial, and especially the systematic review of several randomised trials is so much less likely to mislead us, it has become the gold standard for judging whether a treatment does more good than harm . . . And if no randomised trial has been carried out for our patient's predicament, we follow the trail to the next best external evidence and work from there' 20 . Evidence derived from biological mechanisms is described as`weaker'. The pendulum has swung far from Bernard's philosophy of medical science.
Like many successful movements, evidence-based medicine owes much of its success to recommending a direction of travel which is consistent with popular feeling. Medicine had been slow to incorporate systematic reviews of relevant trials into advice and routine practice 21 . The concept that there is some external repository of truth that, if properly applied, creates effective healthcare has proved attractive to several interested groups. It offers the opportunity of better`value for money' (although not cheapness, of course) to those who manage healthcare. It is an essential component of the movement towards clinical governance in the NHS. It gives politicians and managers the opportunity to treat quality of healthcare as a product like a can of beans, where the criteria of quality are established and incontrovertible. More laudably, perhaps, it has given patient groups, progressively more distrustful of professional expertise, a means of de®ning better treatment.
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It has offered, in other words, the prospect of removing the professional dominance of medicine and replacing it with something transparent, almost formulaic, against which medical advice can be tested. The concept of a`hierarchy of evidence' also gives overriding importance to one particular scienti®c disciplineÐironically the same statistical approach that had such dif®culty in ®nding its rightful place. No such formulaic process is possible, of course, in clinical medicine.
The albumin controversy
Some controversies are illuminating. In 1998 the British Medical Journal published a systematic review of 30 trials on the use of plasma albumin infusions in critically ill patients 22 . Those given albumin showed a 6% increase in mortality. The Secretary of State for Health had been warned of this ®nding. When he took no action a dire calculation was presented to the media. If 1 in 17 critically ill patients receiving albumin had died as a result of his failure to act, several hundred patients had already lost their lives unnecessarily. Numbers were mounting by the dayÐ and all at a cost to the NHS of almost £12m a year. One could almost hear the creak of the body carts each morning as they collected the innocent victims of government negligence. Broadcast news programmes and press articles took up this theme. The Observer summarized the argument in its headline`300 Dead as Health Chiefs Dither'. The Secretary of State for Health referred to this as`hysterical' and set up an expert group to review the evidence. The president and secretary of the Intensive Care Society wrote to the British Medical Journal to point out that television and radio sets were abundant in intensive care units and their waiting areas, and relatives might well have received this information as their loved ones were receiving albumin. Parents were reported as asking doctors whether`killer uids' were going to be used on their children. Meanwhile some hospitals withdrew the supply of plasma albumin. Professional opinion was provoked, but in a divergent way. In the picturesque phrase of the editor of the British Medical Journal,`The earth moved' as the journal was bombarded with largely critical responses 23 . One reason for this, he concluded, was a clash of cultures between doctors who were struggling hard to treat sick patients and researchers who worked in the world of written evidence. He did not seem to appreciate that the researchers were of one particular philosophical persuasion. The distinction was not quite as simple as he claimed. Certainly, the correspondence exhibited more than its fair share of the language of condemnation. The review was`super®cial and its conclusions exaggerated', a tribute to`the use of key words and modern computer technology'. The paper showed the`ignorance and incomprehension on the part of statisticians untrained in burns care'. Perhaps most revealing was the author's two-sentence response to the preceding twelve letters. None of the correspondents, they stated, had provided`any evidence that albumin is bene®cial in critically ill patients'. Their conclusion therefore stood 24 .
A naõ Ève observer might well be surprised at the last comment. The correspondence was apparently full of evidence: it was not, however, their sort of evidence (i.e. based upon aggregation of randomized controlled trials). The evidence consisted of case series, clinical analysis and physiological arguments that were introduced to challenge the validity and relevance of the review. Perhaps, for instance, in a patient with overwhelming infection, the phase when albumin is useful is limited: after this period, as blood vessels become permeable, albumin might leak out and damage the tissues. However, physiology in isolation cannot give a de®nitive answer. Indeed recent studies have demonstrated the capacity of albumin on the one hand to produce fatal injury to cells and on the other to assist tissues by enhancing the delivery of oxygen. Nevertheless, an overview of physiological and clinical evidence with evidence from clinical trials might have provided a more persuasive view on where albumin infusions could be lifesaving rather than life-threatening. As it is, the debate gives the impression of blinkered combatants ®ghting for the status of their own perspective. If the review group took a narrow view of relevant evidence, their critics used language which revives memories of the writings of Bernard and Pearson. One headline unintentionally epitomizes these strong historic forces:`Statisticians not trained in burns care should not evaluate data'. Almroth Wright could not have put it better.
After the passage of a year, the Government-appointed expert group concluded that there was no justi®cation for immediate action. More research was needed.
The homoeopathy meta-analysis
Few medical scientists are persuaded of the ef®cacy of homoeopathy. Some regard its rejection as a test of faith in the scienti®c basis of medicine. In®nite dilution to the exclusion of a single molecule of a drug, on any accepted pharmacological principle, renders the drug inactive. True, there have been ad hoc theories suggesting that somehow a drug molecule leaves its mark on a solution and that thesè ®ngerprints' in the solvent are ef®cacious, but these are generally regarded as incredible.
It was surprising, therefore, that in 1997, when The Lancet published a meta-analysis of controlled trials of homoeopathy in the treatment of a variety of conditions 25 , the overall outcome showed statistically highly signi®cant bene®t. The authors were obviously disconcerted by the unexpected result. The discussion of their ®ndings gives an
A u g u s t 2 0 0 0 impression of a search for release from a particularly unpleasant hook of their own making. When the results of treating individual diseases were examined, the bene®t was too small to justify recommendation, they concluded. Nevertheless, this did not remove the uncomfortably positive overall result. They sought, without success, mundane explanations. But the effect seemed too large to be explained by publication bias, unless there had been literally thousands of unpublished negative studies. Perhaps awed positive studies were distorting the result. Even when they analysed only high-quality studies, the effect remained. The conclusion reached was an almost universal one in such an uncongenial situation; more research was obviously needed. Issues of The Lancet over succeeding weeks contained several contributions attempting to explain how the results of the meta-analysis could have been biased. Few seriously considered the opposite conclusion, that homoeopathy was bene®cial. Ultimately readers were left with the impression that, rather than strengthening the case for homoeopathy, the original paper had weakened the case for meta-analysis.
I do not wish to enter this particular debate, although I share the view that unintentional bias was probably at the root of a surprising ®nding. What is disconcerting, for those who attribute dominance to aggregated trial data in a hierarchy of evidence, is that for the majority of clinicians a simple form of molecular science reversed a conclusion based upon clinical trials 26 . To sharpen this conclusion, let us take a completely hypothetical example of the opposite process. The results from a group of trials on the effects of discontinuing cigarette smoking are pooled in a meta-analysis. The results show no reduction in the incidence of lung cancer. What impact would this have on clinical practice? It would have none. Medical scienti®c publications would quickly be ®lled with explanations based upon clinical or molecular science: the studies were of too short a duration, patients were concealing the habit, for some reason low-risk patients had been selected who would not have succumbed to lung cancer, and so on. Pre-existing beliefs, based upon clinical and experimental evidence, would acquire overriding importance in the interpretation of trial data.
Vitamin A I do not argue for a return to an earlier hierarchy of evidence that places observational or pathophysiological data at the apex. Sometimes physiological explanations can be reversed by changing epidemiology. Vitamin A has undergone more changes in its fortunes than most alleged keys to good health. Originally identi®ed as an essential vitamin that could prevent blindness, it was found to cause fatal disease in explorers who ate excessive quantities of polar bear liver. Later, addition of vitamin A to the diet was found to reduce mortality in malnourished children in the developing world. In more recent times laboratory experiments showed that it has a powerful antioxidant action, protecting tissues against damage produced by active oxygen radicals. On the basis of such studies it was argued that vitamin A would have a bene®cial effect upon the ageing process and prevent heart attacks. Since oxidant damage to DNA was believed to cause cancer in some circumstances, it was argued that the vitamin might also prevent cancers. In epidemiological studies, high levels of the vitamin were indeed associated with low rates of certain cancers and heart disease. A biological mechanism would appear to have predicted a clinical disease. Vitamin A enjoyed considerable success as a dietary supplement. However, when controlled trials were conducted, there were 18% more deaths from lung cancer in smokers who took vitamin A as beta-carotene. Laboratory science followed the lead of epidemiology. In April 1999, a collaborative laboratory study from Texas and Bologna 27 indicated that beta-carotene induced enzymes that activated aromatic hydrocarbons in tobacco smoke: these produced active carcinogens. This mechanism has now achieved biological credibility, rather than the earlier hypothesis that vitamin A protects DNA from oxidant damage. The conclusion has been revised not because the biochemistry is superior but because the clinical information has been reversed.
The credibility of any single piece of evidence depends upon its consistency with other evidence from diverse sources. Decision-making in medicine is based upon a synthesis of this information. The doctor who treats a patient is an inheritor of the rewards of this integration without suffering the pain of achieving it.
CONCLUSION
Both physiological determinism and statistical generalization have, in the course of the last two centuries, laid claims to exclusivity in medical advance. In the mid-nineteenth century, victory went to physiological determinism. In Britain, clinical practice, with its emphasis on the`art' rather than the science of medicine, was more successful in maintaining its position than in continental Europe and the United States, where physiological determinism was embraced more wholeheartedly. Numerical analysis, in its later form of clinical epidemiology, had a hard battle to gain acceptance. The most it claimed initially was a modest contribution to medical practice. Later, history went into reverse as the very success of science rendered better evaluation essential and the inadequacy of physiological determinism in isolation became apparent. Out of this there
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V o l u m e 9 3 A u g u s t 2 0 0 0 emerged a new claim for priority as`evidence-based medicine' sought top position in a delusional hierarchy of evidence. Ultimately, perhaps, recognition of the need for synthesis based upon respect for the legitimacy of all three cultures may be achieved. Meanwhile, we inherit a rather troublesome bequest as we struggle to cope with the successes of science.
